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MAXINE’S CHOICE(S) 
Freedom, aesthetics, and the agôn of living in Maxine Greene’s 
work 
 
John Baldacchino 
University of Dundee, Scotland 
 
Abstract: Maxine Greene argues that to take a position is to make a choice. 
This choice is concrete, free and active. It is a matter by which one does 
philosophy and by which one engages one’s action with the world. More 
importantly, Greene’s work confirms that we cannot essentialize our 
choices into a series of experiential reactions. Many seem to forget that 
choices are active decisions in that they deeply represent our ability to turn 
experience into forms of anticipation. Starting with experience, Greene 
asserts a Deweyian stance, especially when this is markedly posed as 
active, rather than passive. When it comes to choice there is a curious 
relationship between Greene’s and Arendt’s approach on the relationship 
between choice, freedom and action. This paper will confirm how beyond 
Arendt and Dewey, Greene asserts her own originality, where her 
philosophical approach is often mediated by her equally original take on 
art and aesthetics education. In Greene, one finds how choice also presents 
us with necessary tensions that articulate an agôn of living; indeed, an 
agôn of creation by which we sustain our ways of living—democratically 
and together—but also by struggling against what continues to separate 
us into isolated individuals in societies that are fragmented by obstacles 
and oppression.  
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MAXINE’S CHOICE(S) 
Freedom, aesthetics, and the agôn of living in Maxine Greene’s 
philosophy 
 
John Baldacchino 
University of Dundee, Scotland 
 
The time may have come again for the painting of murals. The time may have 
come again for the shaping of visions of social possibility, of new kinds of 
art projects and forestry projects and day care programs. It may have 
come for new experiments with apprenticeships arrangements, storefront 
schools and workshops, coalitions never seen before. And surely it is a 
moment for engagement with newcomers, for consulting their 
perspectives, for extending the dialogue far beyond the agencies and 
offices and even classrooms, for reaching beyond the “sad opaqueness of 
private life.”  
 
— Maxine Greene, “Between Past and Future” (ND, 13, added emphasis) . 
 
The performing arts … have a strong affinity with politics. Performing 
artists … need an audience to show their virtuosity, just as acting men 
need the presence of others before whom they can appear; both need a 
publicly organized space of their “work”, and both depend upon others for 
the performance itself. Such a space of appearances is not to be taken for 
granted wherever men live together in a community. The Greek polis once 
was precisely that “form of government” which provided men with a 
space of appearances where they could act, with a kind of theater where 
freedom could appear. 
 
— Hannah Arendt, “What is freedom?” (Arendt, 2000a, 446-447, added 
emphasis) 
 
In a convocation address that she gave to Teachers College, which she titles, 
inspired by Hannah Arendt, “Between Past and Future: The Becoming of 
Teachers College,” Maxine Greene brings moments from the 1930s close to those 
of the 1960s. While the 1930s are significant to any Deweyan, specifically in the 
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light of his books Freedom and culture, Individualism old and new and Liberalism and 
social action (Dewey, 1989; 1984; 2000), the 1960s came to represent another 
turbulent time, where the Vietnam War and the student riots produced a 
significant backdrop of events. In these moments from the past, Greene finds 
parallels running between the College of Dewey’s time and that of the 1960s. In 
turn she goes on to project a future where, by recalling Arendt, she argues that 
we seem to be living “in what we experience as an interlude between past and 
future.” (Greene, ND, 1) 
 As Greene recalls “the time of the so-called ‘police bust’ on the Columbia 
campus after which many of the activities spilled over” to the other side of West 
120th Street in Teachers College, she states that, “it is hard to forget the sound of 
guitars in the corridors, the notices pinned up in great disorder, the impassioned 
arguments in the corners, the disrupted classes (and, yes, the ‘liberation classes’), 
the shriek (very oddly) of kazoos.” (Greene, ND, 3) Recalling these events, she 
also mentions the sense of hope that students brought to each other in a kind of 
an “interruption of the ordinary.”  
 Greene prefaces these events with a passage from Arendt, which recalls 
World War II and the French Resistance fighter the poet René Char, whom 
Arendt cites while lamenting over the “lost treasure,” which was the experience 
created out of nothing where someone comes out of his or her private life’s 
“opaqueness” and jumps into a future that is unknown.  Paraphrasing Arendt, 
Green states that, “freedom is achieved only when something is consciously 
done to interrupt an automatic sequence of events, when persons come together 
to start something new and embark on what they realize as beginnings without 
assurances or guarantees.” (Greene, ND, 2) Here the emphasis is on how these 
individuals made a conscious choice to become members of the resistance. As to 
whether this choice was entirely free or dictated out of a sense of sacrifice 
towards freedom, becomes central to how freedom and choice would (or could) 
converge.  
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 As expected from any speech or lecture by Maxine Greene, in her convocation 
address she covers a wide range of moments—literary, historical, artistic and 
indeed educational—by which she brings the actuality of the time into vibrant 
force. Then, towards the end she muses, as if tempting her audience, with an idea 
of revolt. She states boldly:  “The time may have come again for the painting of 
murals.” (Greene ND, 13) 
 
 
Maxine’s murals 
 
To choose a specific art form in order to assert a political choice is very intriguing 
though not surprising when it comes to Maxine Greene. Yet being the avid 
Arendt scholar that Greene was, one wonders whether she was also thinking of 
Arendt’s essay “What is Freedom?” where Arendt makes a very sharp 
distinction between creative and performing arts, and where she states that “the 
creative artist is free in the process of creation, but that creative process is not 
displayed in public and not destined to appear in the world. Hence the element 
of freedom,” Arendt goes on to say, “certainly present in the creative arts, 
remains hidden” as it is not the process that appears but it is the art-work that 
remains (Arendt 2000a, 446). In contrast, performance artists, “need an audience 
to show their virtuosity,” where by dint of this virtuosity there is a space for 
freedom in the agôn of a polis where everyone is entitled to occupy, dispute and 
question the state of affairs by which we live. 
 In Greene’s defense, her choice of a creative art is meant to be public. Unlike 
Arendt, she seems to argue that there is a choice in that all art forms represent an 
underlying sense of freedom, by which, in that context, they could transcend the 
lack of choice that students may have felt when opposing the Vietnam war and 
the political Establishment which sustained it. Arendt’s position is different here 
in how she already categorizes those art forms that are capable of being shown 
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and others that remain hidden; in other words, where art in itself needs a specific 
formal context by which it could or could not express freedom to an audience. 
 Here, Greene transcends this formal distinction, and while she celebrates the 
performative ways by which the students expressed themselves through music, 
she chose the visual medium to explain the magnitude by which she expressed 
the student’s protest and the sense of freedom and struggle that they 
manifested—that of painting murals.  
 Though not performed, mural art needs an audience. One would recall the 
radical role of murals as these emerged from many struggles across the world. 
During the struggle for freedom against the tyranny of Augusto Pinochet, 
Chilean muralists produced some of the most memorable murals that have 
become emblematic of both the memory of Salvador Allende’s shattered dream 
and the dream of those who ultimately won back their freedom. Their choice was 
visibly done and celebrated. Their freedom, or rather their claim to freedom, was 
chosen by the expression of the visual. Likewise, one recalls the murals that 
emerged in Northern Ireland during the “Troubles” that spanned across thirty 
years between the 1960s and the 1990s. Both Unionists and Republicans used 
mural art to memorialize their heroes and to accentuate the struggle for what 
each regarded, from their opposed perspectives, as a call for war. Here the choice 
was far from hidden.  
 Remarkably, since the 1990s when the Northern Ireland Peace Process 
successfully stopped the violence between Catholics and Protestants, mural art 
was transformed into another kind of historical memory. New murals are now 
found on the so-called Peace Walls, where artists from across the communities 
and even from other parts of the world, come together to transform the walls that 
once divided the city into spaces for peace.  
 Making one’s claim to peace and freedom is widespread. The emblematic 
notion of a wall and how communities of artists take it over, recalls the many 
walls that are still erected in the world. If Maxine was still with us she would talk 
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about the walls that Hungary recently built around its borders to keep out 
refugees from Syria where indeed choices clash and the sense of freedom is 
separated from what the Hungarian side calls security and the refugees see as a 
need to survive. To that, we would add more walls, such as the wall that divides 
Palestine and Israel, and other physical divisions that claim to guarantee 
security, while in effect, they are meant to keep people out while asserting the 
choice of the powerful to suppress the freedom of others—a closer to home wall, 
would be the one that became a center of dispute over the US-Mexico border. 
Now on that, Maxine would have been very vocal! 
 Once the muralist claims her space, individually or as part of a community of 
artists, the claim is a choice that becomes a matter of freedom and inclusion. Here 
Greene is asserting that to choose to perform in the agonistic space of the polis is 
to choose to assert one’s democratic right for freedom. It is also a claim for an 
associated form of living that Dewey famously equates with democracy (Dewey, 
1966). Against this democratic backdrop, Greene reminds us that to take a 
position is to make a choice—a choice of freedom that exits the opaqueness of a 
self-centered life by breaking the walls that surround it. This is a choice that is 
always done freely, over and beyond any context—which is where, as we will 
see, Greene may differ with Arendt, whose assumptions of choice are limited by 
specific contexts, and which depend on how the degree by which humans 
engage in an active life, which in and of itself, leaves us with no choice as it is 
bound by the community. 
 Arendt argues that, 
Action as distinguished from fabrication, is never possible in isolation; to 
be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act. Action and speech need 
the surrounding presence of others no less than fabrication needs the 
surrounding presence of nature for its material, and of a world in which to 
place the finished product” (Arendt, 1998, 188).  
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 Moreover let’s not forget that Arendt (2000a) also argues that “the raison d’être 
of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action” (440). In terms of 
experience, it is important to note that Greene’s work confirms that we cannot 
order our choices into a series of experiential reactions. Choices are active 
decisions that deeply represent our ability to turn experience into forms of 
anticipation, as Alfred Schutz reminds us when, after Husserl, he makes a case for 
what he calls protention (Baldacchino, 2009, 100). Schutz states, “any experience 
refers likewise to the future. It carries along protentions of occurrences expected 
to follow immediately” (Schutz, 1970, 139). More so, when one engages with 
Greene’s notion of choice and how she lays it out to her diverse audiences, one 
senses a clear convergence. It feels that she is almost bridging her Schutzian 
reading of Dewey’s notion of experience and her take on Arendt’s approach to 
freedom through her notion of action.  
 Yet, here, it seems that Greene moves one step beyond Arendt in that for her 
choice is regarded as an action that pertains to the human “spirit” as it travels on 
the dual track of freedom (qua action) and intelligence (qua choice). In this light, 
one needs to be careful not to conflate Greene with either Dewey or Arendt, as if 
she simply follows suit from them. In many ways, here one could see how 
Greene emerges as an independent thinker and more so an original one who 
takes us into new ways of approaching experience and choice vis-à-vis the idea 
of freedom.    
 Greene also confirms how choice as action presents us with necessary 
tensions. Choice never comes without a cost even when we aspire to choose 
freely and intelligently. The tension presented by choice is an integral part of an 
agôn of living, indeed an agôn of creation by which we sustain our ways of 
living. This happens within the contexts of democracy as a form of associative 
living, but also through the risky leap that one takes into the unknown, as when 
one decides to struggle against what continues to separate humanity into 
isolated individuals in societies that are fragmented by obstacles and oppression.  
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 While I do share my experience with those who cherish the image and 
memory of Maxine Greene the optimist who believed in possibilities and who 
shared with everyone a sense of continuous hope, I also bear in mind and remind 
others that Greene’s work never presents an assured form of positing the world 
with unfounded hope or with an obsession of happiness at all costs—which so 
often characterizes the wholesale alienation of so many individuals with the 
deluded promises which, more often than not, distort the realities of 
contemporary society.  
 Greene was not an identitarian thinker, and she never succumbed to the 
positivistic assumptions that remain rife in aspects of education and the arts 
where somehow people think that baseless optimism is better than nothing. One 
will be seriously undermining and misunderstanding Maxine Greene if one were 
to fail to appreciate how her philosophy of the self and the imagination 
represents an agonized approach to the world that is marked by paradox. Even 
though many of her adulators somehow always expected her to be evangelical 
about the imagination and the role of the arts in education and the world, her 
foundations firmly rest in the existential sobriety by which she greeted her 
audience with her early books Existential Encounters for Teachers (1967) and the 
Teacher as Stranger (1973).   
 Greene’s work is agonized by dint of its provenance. It comes from and 
resides in the public square while it also aspires to move beyond the walls of the 
city, the polis. Those who have known Maxine personally often find it difficult to 
separate her image from that of the sage who warmly welcomes everybody in 
her apartment on 5th Avenue, where in the last several decades of her life, she 
held her classes and her famous salons. Beyond this very metropolitan image of 
Maxine the New Yorker, in her work, she makes choices which clearly partake of 
disputes, of thoughtfulness, and of a creative risk that harnesses every notion of 
possibility, in all its imagined good, bad and ugly aspects, where the city itself is 
dismantled and where we are invited to exit with her into a much wider world. 
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Not unlike Arendt, Maxine could disappoint those who wanted to see in her the 
benign sage that would fulfill a sense of inclusive happiness. Her sense of choice 
and freedom were steeled by a dialectic that was never happy with synthetic 
results.   
 Unlike many of those who write about her and who rightly cherish her work, 
I do not regard Greene’s choices and possibilities as some Pentecostal moment 
where suddenly the gathered are touched by the Spirit. Rather, I consider 
Greene’s work as being moved by a Stoic duty towards the demand to exit into 
society but without the excessive fervor of the spirit, and where by their own 
commitment humans confirm once more that the social remains integral to the 
choices and possibilities that we create for ourselves together and through our 
actions. In fact, Greene’s work insists that nothing should be taken for granted 
and that there is no guaranteed spirit to come and liberate us from oppression.  
 If the imagination is released, it is not because its spirit fills us with blind 
courage. On the contrary the courage comes from the sober realization that we 
are to speak of such a wide-awakening because it is a release that operates 
through tenacious and rigorous processes of self-reflection that are distinctly 
marked by the challenge to live with and care for others.  
 Not unlike Arendt, Greene never defers the human condition to a divine 
order or to a secure ideology. Some might see her as a “liberal” (understood in 
the American sense of a progressive thinker), but she was more of a radical who 
would stand to anyone who might come with an ideological recipe, whether this 
happens to regard itself on the Left or the Right. Greene moved beyond such 
provincial domains, and though one cannot simply equate her work with 
Arendt’s philosophy, one could see a similar resolve in terms of how an active 
life for both philosophers leads to a sense of stoic freedom, burnished by the 
realities of the world. Both women suffered from dissent towards them and 
when one follows back Greene’s struggle within the educational and academic 
establishments, the image of a revered gentle nonagenarian is no longer mild and 
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accepting of everything. To cite Agnes Heller’s Radical Philosophy, Maxine Greene 
was a radical philosopher, who “attempts to make everyone conscious of their 
right and their duty to think for themselves” (Heller, 1987, 135).  
 This explains why Greene is so critical of those assumptions that preset 
liberty as a negation of obstacles — what Isaiah Berlin (1998) calls negative 
liberty. In Greene’s work, liberty comes from the acts by which a sense of 
existential futurity (to use a term she borrows from Sartre) urges us to own up to 
associated living by constantly attempting to liberate ourselves from what 
Virginia Woolf likens to being numbed by cotton wool (See Woolf, 1985, 73; and 
Greene, 2000, 27). This call to freedom is never guaranteed by blind hope. Nor is 
it secured by a facile sense of liberty. Rather, the only hope that is generated 
through choice comes from a suffered sense of duty by which we act as citizens, 
and where freedom is articulated by those associated forms of living by which 
we gain the ability to live with others in a republic of equals.  
 
To occupy philosophy 
 
Greene’s style of pedagogical and philosophical disputatio was very different 
from what was expected of a philosopher teaching or making an argument. 
Often she appears to speak exousia, where her argument takes strength and is 
elaborated by dint of her own power of conviction and choice—a choice and 
conviction by which she invites her students to contextualize, dispute, and own 
their thinking. This was her strength, though one could argue that this was also 
her weakness in that her generosity was often mistaken for an opening to engage 
on one’s own whims when in effect this was a wrong perception that came from 
those who failed to understand how Greene engaged with her own sources and 
how she developed her own original philosophical argument within the poetic 
spaces of the political imaginary.   
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 Even in her writing, one needs to be cautious because the material she used 
often went into the background. Thus while her voice emerged as a unique blend 
of several ideas that always appeared new and fresh, those who mistook or 
missed her sources quickly attributed notions to Greene that weren’t hers (her 
use of Schutz’s notion of wide-awakeness and her engagement with Sartre’s 
theories of the imagination and the imaginary are good examples — not to 
mention the confusion that is often caused between her and Arendt’s treatment 
of the same concepts).  
 Because many failed to check how Greene’s work relates to an identifiable set 
of arguments, they also failed to appreciate how she carefully constructed her 
own position, especially when she was clearly building on a much wider horizon 
of ideas. Upon missing Greene’s sources, some would simply dismiss her as yet 
another teachers’ theorist. Others adulated her to extents that were clearly 
absurd and which irritated her on end (even though she did not show it). Many 
critics and adulators alike failed to understand and distinguish between the 
moments when Greene spoke on her own strength and when she was framing 
the context of her argument in rich literary, artistic and philosophical traditions 
that often moved beyond American shores but still commented on the 
development of American lives—as she often did once she was at that desired 
vantage point of philosophical argument.    
 This was the main reason that prompted me to write a book on her work 
(Baldacchino, 2009), and to focus on her philosophy of the self and the aesthetic 
imaginary by having a “conversation” with her own sources rather than with the 
consequences of her writing (as others preferred to do). Hearing those who cited 
her blindly or those who quietly showed their discomfort about her work, it was 
evident that many chose to short change Greene’s work.  
 Often adulators and detractors alike did not bother to understand where 
Maxine Greene’s rich philosophy was coming from. Many still choose to forget 
that Greene’s strong background in literature cannot be ignored in her 
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scholarship and method of analysis. This method informed philosophy in a 
unique way. Many wrongly assume that Greene had a smooth ride with 
philosophy and philosophers. Yet she did not, as she was often treated as an 
outsider. Reading her early work, especially the papers she wrote about 
literature and its relationship with education, one finds the literary critic meeting 
the philosopher of education, often on the grounds of a political argument for 
existence. So while she would cite existentialists, Greene does not offer the 
philosopher’s approach to the subject, but comes to philosophy as a literary arts 
specialist, who, with a critical eye, also reads the narrative by which the 
philosopher comes across the world, politically and as an educator of sorts. 
Likewise, when engaging with education, Greene does not follow the expected 
educational trajectory, which one would find in the traditional fields of 
education—especially those prevalent in NYU and then Teachers College where 
she taught for a long time. Greene’s position within an education school was 
never an easy or comfortable one. While towards the end of her life she was 
considered with a degree of reverence, in the education community Maxine was 
never what one would call mainstream. This what makes her unique, and this is 
where she is revered but equally misunderstood, and at times ignored.   
 Sometimes in Greene’s work the teacher plays the role of a character, as if she 
were to come out of a novel. This does not make the teacher a fictive construct. 
Far from it! Rather, by putting the image of the teacher in her unique intellectual 
genealogy, Greene elicits from the figure of the teacher a stranger who is 
intentionally kept away from benign or easy familiarity.  Often her teacher is 
indeed a literary critic engaging with one of Sartre’s characters, or a figure 
coming out of Camus’s novels. So the stranger in a book of hers like Teacher as 
Stranger plays various roles and typically wears different masks, just as 
Kierkegaard did.  
 Greene’s educator is a philosopher, a teacher, a literary and artistic character, 
living and trying to make sense of the latter half of the 20th century. Likewise she 
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positions herself in education from within other parameters, which are not 
always recognized by many educationalists. In this respect, like her image of the 
teacher, Greene remains a stranger to education in that she refuses to foreclose 
education with the conditional assumptions that are found in the schooled 
narratives of positivist methods and approaches.  
 This further explains why Greene often recalls her struggle to claim and 
assert her role as a philosopher. While her first obstacle was her gender, more 
than her gender, there was her way of doing philosophy. Her approach irked 
many philosophers as much as it irritated literary critics, art theorists and 
educationalists alike. Greene often approached philosophy by way of privileging 
those spheres that are found beyond philosophy. She is in the category of 
philosophers amongst whom Richard Rorty (1980) considered himself to be — 
philosophers who are more inclined to be artists and poets, philosophers like 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and indeed Derrida, to name a few. This is a philosophy 
that would edify, but which is no less rigorous and stoic where it matters.  
 There is also a political reason, and by political here I mean a state of affairs 
that belongs to the polis as we have come to know it in the classical sense of the 
Greek city state, whose republican foundations were later tempered by Romanic 
law. Greene somehow turns the agora, the marketplace of philosophy, into an 
artist’s studio and a factory’s shop floor where making takes place as a distinct 
form of radical poetics. This is where she would become a “philosopher in 
residence” just as an “artist in residence” would occupy a space and transform it 
into a studio open to a community of practitioners. As if this were not enough, in 
the space of philosophy-turned-studio-shop-floor, Greene brings along with her an 
audience of arts practitioners, readers, teachers and many students who would 
normally have no business with philosophy.  
 However, here I would put in a caveat, as I want to clarify that just as the 
artist does not democratize the arts by simply being “in-residence,” I do not see 
Maxine Greene as simply democratizing philosophy. Rather I see her as asserting 
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the philosophical space into a relational location of autonomy. Like Nietzsche, 
Greene would not approve of “those hodgepodge philosophers who call 
themselves ‘philosophers of reality’ or ‘positivists’– just the sight of them is enough 
to instil a dangerous mistrust in the soul of an ambitious young scholar” (Nietzsche, 
2002, §204, 95). If you want, Greene’s work is a bit like the Occupy Movement. It 
takes over the square, the agora, to return it to what it once was: a space of 
arguing qua making, an agôn whose agogia gives us a unique meaning to 
ped(ago)gy.  
 As someone who uses the space of philosophy as an artist’s studio, I know 
very well that this often irritates philosophers and is often considered to be an 
unphilosophical transgression. But I would hasten to add that this also irritates 
artists, especially when artists who try to pose as pseudo-philosophers fall flat on 
their face by their half-baked ideas in studio critiques. Like Maxine Greene, I 
came to philosophy from equally ambiguous areas of arts practice, where 
philosophy is privileged. However, this privilege is not given to philosophy as a 
subject or discipline, but as a different space which one could populate with 
other than philosophy.  Inversely, one can see how Greene does the same with 
the spaces of the arts and education, where she in turn opens these spaces wide 
so that the crowd would own the agora.  
 This is clearly seen in education, where Greene defies all conventions and 
what educationalists still privilege over anything else. In bringing together a 
community of practice into the space of philosophy, Greene rejects those 
circumstances that would limit education to a practicism that is often hollowed 
out of any criticality. She is equally opposed to the measured functionalism that 
creeps in to suffocate any attempt to articulate action with contemplation and 
vice-versa. “We are interested in education here, not in schooling”, she states in 
the opening pages of her Variations on a Blue Guitar (Greene, 2001, 7).  
 Yet we must be vigilant not to confuse Greene’s notion of education with that 
which is often limited to the precepts of those social scientific assumptions by 
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which education continues to be impoverished and instrumentalized. Greene’s 
definition of education is never invested by formulae of preordained 
development. Once I was told by an art education colleague that “Maxine does 
not do research … she only does Maxine Greene.” Clearly the colleague wanted 
to dissuade me from writing about Greene. This backfired, because to me what 
she said turned out to be the best endorsement and motivation to engage with 
Greene’s work and to write about her.  
 
To do philosophy 
 
As we recall how Greene’s work often jarred with colleagues in the field, we 
know that unlike Arendt, Greene does not reject the appellation of being a 
philosopher. In her interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt was blunt, stating: “I 
have said goodbye to philosophy once and for all. As you know, I studied 
philosophy, but that does not mean that I stayed with it” (Arendt, 2000, 3-4). 
While Arendt seems to be more comfortable with being called a political theorist, 
as we have seen above, Maxine Greene deals with philosophy in a different way, 
though many would agree that Greene’s approach to philosophy is strongly 
influenced by Arendt.  
 Greene’s way out of and back into philosophy is to claim philosophy as a 
doing. As she states, 
[T]o ‘do’ philosophy in the domains of the artistic-aesthetic is to think 
about one’s thinking with regard to the ways in which engagements with 
the arts contribute to ongoing pursuits of meaning, efforts to make sense 
of the world. It is to reflect upon perceived realities as well as those that 
have been conceptualized, and to ponder the phases of remembered 
experiences with the arts (Greene, 1991, 123). 
 Here, the reader must hold onto the notion of doing and what it implies in 
Greene’s work. I would emphasize that the notion of a philosophy that is done 
does not only belong to action and choice, but also to a context where in action 
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and choice we find outlooks that bring freedom to domains of meaning which 
cannot be assumed with certainty.  
 There are necessities that speak out when confronted by the contingencies 
from which the arts invariably emerge. This also begins to explain the radical 
pull of Greene’s work, which moves beyond the critical pedagogical shortcuts by 
which some tend to characterize her work on aesthetics education. More 
importantly, Greene’s work urges us to question—indeed, interrogate—the time 
and certainties by which we live the references that inform her work. This 
happens not because her examples and her theories continue to hold relevance 
today, but because her approach to action and choice remains open to the 
contingencies that characterize history as a horizon on which human beings 
work together by making things and by insisting on acting together. 
 This prompts us to ask whether the assumption of a “transitional time” is a 
reflection of insufficient description, a convenient invention, a sense of 
helplessness, or indeed a sense of hope. Given Greene’s existential provenance 
and her immersion in modern literature, one cannot avoid wondering whether 
she is also inviting the reader to consider time as an expression that assumes a 
desired in-betweenness. Here, we need to ask what we mean by the time we live in 
and how this sustains and articulates what we see as possibility—what Greene, 
after Sartre, calls the futurity by which the imagination becomes a tangible way of 
taking ownership of history and how we do it.  
 This also prompts us to test the frequent assumptions we make of a time we 
deem to be in “transition”. Often people speak of how everything is in a state of 
constant change. Even the attempt to problematize the world is difficult because 
there seems to be nothing grounded enough to be critiqued. Several questions 
are left dangling, suspended. If by the transitional we mean that our descriptions 
remain insufficient because they seem too convenient (or even too inventive), 
does this warrant a sense of helplessness or does it simply call for a new 
approach to how we speak of hope and possibility? How do we articulate our 
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history? Why do we construct our stories? Where and by what means do we 
(re)imagine our day-to-day living? 
 Some would claim that this is an expression of a desired in-betweenness by 
which we live and survive the tedium of everyday life. This takes the shape of 
contiguity—which could be political or pathological, social or educational, 
religious or secular. Confronted by these arguments, Greene takes a unique 
approach. At first, she appears to go with the flow of a contiguous approach, 
only to then stop mid way and begins to critique and question the assumptions 
by which the argument is made.  
 After Greene, we begin to realize that perhaps the best way to pose such 
questions and interrogate the certainties that seem to sustain our hopes and 
possibilities, is to take a look at (a) how various imaginaries are being 
constructed, (b) what we seek to converse about and why, and (c) how do we 
identify an imaginary that becomes comfortable enough to assume itself as a 
horizon of choice and possibility while, in effect, it becomes an obstacle if not a 
form of outright oppression.  
 This goes to the very question of what we learn from what, where and how. 
Often assumptions in the arts, in philosophy and in education begin to look like 
viable ways of bypassing the difficult questions of the philosopher or the artist. A 
tangible example is how some exponents of visual culture have argued that 
visual culture amongst youth could counter what they regard as the elitist 
foundations of aesthetics and art, with the consequence that some have even 
come to the conclusion that the arts in education should give way to visual 
culture and media as effective forms of “learning.” One argument that is often 
flagged up is that this would provide a ground for better inclusion and student 
empowerment. Yet Greene’s work confirms time and again that such shortcuts 
are short-lived and indeed disingenuous. To take such shortcuts is to reinforce 
those forms of representation by which obstacles to freedom and action are 
reinforced.  
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 As we appear to ask questions for which many educators seek a quick answer 
and are often too happy to content themselves with the false assumptions that 
the here and now is always closer to the child’s aesthetic imaginary, we must 
stop and ask: What do we mean by the certainties by which educators must find 
answers and by which they would insist that education is bound to give such 
answers?  
 
Confronted by “the gas chamber of life” 
 
As we seem to go against the flow, and as we begin to articulate sufficient 
questions that would normally support inclusion, equality, and social justice, we 
find ourselves in a quandary. The obstacles are unexpected. Oftentimes, they 
remain hidden under the reassurances by which we take on what we regard as a 
difficulty of origins—that is, as a difficulty found in what we might consider to be 
a progressive point of departure.  
 In other words, we find that the more radical or progressive we appear (or 
want) to be, the more we sustain a system that is oppressive and inherently 
hegemonic. This is also where the quandary of choice becomes crucial and where 
we can see how Greene once again takes choice in a different direction from 
either Arendt or Dewey—not to mention the conscious distance that she keeps 
from the assumptions made by progressive, liberal and critical pedagogies by 
which, more often than not, many try to mistakenly characterize Greene’s own 
work.   
 Greene does this by first of all taking her own view of what free choice may 
or may not be. She does not accept that experience and practice are, in themselves, 
guarantors of a free and intelligent choice. In this respect, Greene is not the 
pragmatist whose sense of reassurance comes from the fact that we are all, in 
some ways, free to choose what to practice. On this she seems to be closer to 
Arendt. Yet unlike Arendt she sustains a dialectical assumption, which however 
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is neither thrust against inevitable historical facts nor split by some private-
public arrangement. Rather, in assuming freedom as intrinsically dialectical, 
Greene takes on the gravitas of the quandary of choice by sustaining it as an 
aporetic stance. Greene (1988) explains this quandary as follows:  
It is difficult to posit obstacles in such an interpreted world. Ordinary life 
provides distractions and comforts for those who might be expected to go 
in search. They live among representations, images, symbolic renderings of what 
might seem (if it were felt and smelled) “the gas chamber of life”. (15, 
emphasis added) 
 The image of the gas chamber is not easy to handle. It is too potent, and one 
could even go as far as saying that it could work against what Greene means to 
convey. However, what makes this analogy distressing is not just the context 
from where it originates—the Shoah—but in how it compels the senses. In other 
words, Greene is making an aesthetic argument. The analogy of the gas 
chamber—“(if it were felt and smelled)”—correlates to the “images, symbolic 
renderings of what might seem”—and, more importantly, the representational 
character by which we construct, feel and sensitize all that we do, including the 
obstacles that we create for ourselves.  
 The qualm with the quandary of representation is not uncommon. Here, 
rather than Arendt, I would recall Gillian Rose’s discussion of representation and 
what she calls the binary relationship between the fascism of representation and the 
representation of fascism in her book Mourning becomes the Law (1997). In this essay, 
Rose is discussing Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day (Ishiguro, 2010), 
where she engages in quite a complex discussion of legality and representation 
(see Baldacchino, 2014). In Rose’s essay, the general tenor of what Greene is here 
calling the “obstacles of an interpreted world” similarly emerge in how 
representation signifies a fascistic ordering by which legality is entangled with 
the precariousness of our moral and aesthetic decisions.  
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 Though I have mentioned it elsewhere, I never looked closely into a direct 
and possible correlation between Rose and Greene. This is not the first time that I 
found parallels between their work, particularly in their separate readings of 
Arendt, and in how, like Arendt, they find themselves revisiting fascism and are 
not fearful in using very difficult analogies which many cannot handle, 
especially when both Greene and Rose do not appear to seek specific 
resolution(s) (See Baldacchino, 2009, 13ff). 
 Though it is all too easy to argue that like Arendt, Greene and Rose were 
Jewish women of a certain philosophical formation, one cannot ignore their 
rejection of quick answers or convenient short cuts. There are some considerable 
differences in that, for example, while Arendt and Greene never seem to be taken 
by Adorno, Gillian Rose wrote a classic book on his philosophy, focusing in 
particular on his non-identitarian approach (Rose, 1978). And yet whenever I 
read their work, I am always engaged by how they never fail to disturb those all 
too comfortable patterns by which commentators and analysts of the Left and the 
Right are quick to deliver their answers. And as we speak of comfort zones, let’s 
not forget that education is also a zone in which all too many want to find 
reassurance—a reassurance which Greene rejected. To further articulate Greene’s 
exposition of the obstacles of our represented life, we cannot ignore education, 
by which she further gives context to the gas chambers of life: 
In schools, like other institutions, there are memos, not actual barriers to 
reflective practice. There are conference and commission reports, not 
barbed wire fences in the way. There are assured, helpful, bureaucratic 
faces, not glowering antagonists to growth and freedom and an enlarged 
sense of being in the world. (Greene, 1988, 15) 
 Here, one could see how the fascism of representation begins to emerge in its 
reality (and its lived experience). Like an odorless gas, fascism returns 
unannounced. Oftentimes, the fascism of representation remains concealed 
behind the benign assumptions of matters like growth, freedom and care. This 
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makes the quandaries of education acute. Such quandaries do hurt and many are 
never ready to accept them. They become tortuous when we realize that what we 
deem to be a liberal and progressive attempt to eliminate obstacles has 
developed into a form of groundedness that forecloses any possibility of reform. 
This would in turn reinforce the representation of fascism through the very social 
expectations by which we try to build a democratic consensus. As Greene 
reminds us “the ‘weight’ is only dimly felt; yet, for many it is accepted as what 
Milan Kundera describes: It must be; es muss sein.” (Greene 1988, p. 15)  
 
When obstacles become artifacts 
 
The impossibility of positing “obstacles in such an interpreted world” (Greene, 
1988, 15) partly comes from the fact that the obstacle becomes an artifact and that 
we fail to understand the correlation between the creative yet oppressive nature 
of representation. The correlation between creativity and oppressive 
representation is contingent on the fact that it is a human construct. Those who 
would insist that representation is received as some natural necessity of 
creativity, fail to understand the relationship between experience and nature. As 
Dewey (1958) reminds us 
[T]he assumption that nature in itself is all of the same kind, all distinct, 
explicit and evident, having no hidden possibilities, no novelties or 
obscurities, is possible only on the basis of a philosophy which at some 
point draws an arbitrary line between nature and experience (21).  
 Greene (1988) clearly states that, “these obstacles or blocks or impediments 
are, as it were, artifacts, human creations, not ‘natural’ or objectively existent 
necessities” (9). As artifacts, obstacles could move from being instruments or 
relations, to become objects crafted by tools of reason or of oppression, indeed of 
instrumental or critical reason. Yet, almost as if by some Cartesian instinct, we 
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often miss the direct relationship between what we think and what we make, 
and where thoughts are more reified than a tangible object.   
 As artifacts, these obstacles pertain to the poetics of the imaginary—by which, 
in other words, we are the very makers of the obstacles that we put in our own 
way and that of others. Greene’s characterization of obstacles as artifacts is 
crucial, especially when we come to discuss her position on aesthetics education. 
Greene’s contribution to this field is found in how she represents the imaginary, 
what it means to us who construct such an imaginary, and how it radically 
differs from the universalistic and naturalist postures by which the arts and 
creativity in education are often assumed.  
 More so, to recognize the artefactual nature of obstacles is crucial to how we 
engage with philosophy, particularly in the fields of pedagogical aesthetics, 
philosophy of education and political philosophy. If we are to speak of 
philosophy as a doing, and if by implication we go on to actually do philosophy, 
then as in a poetic state of affairs philosophy becomes itself an artefactual affair. 
As Greene puts it, “We cannot teach freedom or autonomy directly, anymore 
than we can teach a common decency; but we can do something to enable people 
to achieve them, something not unlike what we do when we teach literature or 
chemistry. Certain acts must be performed, certain tasks accomplished if 
individuals are to be enabled to choose themselves as free. They are acts involving the 
posing of problems and the referring of such problems to the context of action” 
(Greene, 1975, 11).  
 In this scenario, we begin to feel the discomfort that Greene creates when she 
brings into the spaces of philosophy other makings, primarily those by which we 
construct imaginaries of possibility, and by which we speak of doings whose 
remains are found out with the assumptions of philosophy as assumed by the 
philosophers. For Greene, this presumed state of estrangement between 
philosophy and education is not an issue. As we have seen, unlike Arendt, she 
does not bid goodbye to philosophy in order to exercise her right to be a political 
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theorist or an artist or educator. Rather, Greene tells the philosopher that she is 
announcing other deeds within philosophy’s space and that she is claiming the 
right to do so by dint of the choice of action, and thereby that of freedom.   
 At this point, one might want to ask why is it necessary to glaringly intrude 
and even transgress the spaces of the arts, philosophy and education? Couldn’t 
one effect such a transgression by simply opening these spaces beyond their 
location, by moving them into each other? Greene refuses to do so because while 
she transgresses such spaces she insists on the specificity of art, philosophy and 
education. She is no less rigorous as a philosopher than she is as a literary critic, 
or teacher. By dispelling the absurd argument that art and philosophy would 
simply make an instant liberating hybrid, Greene shows that the intervention of 
making in philosophy is never easy and it is a matter by which the agôn of 
making becomes a form of disputation—a dialectic for which she is not even 
seeking a synthetic resolution.  
 Here, I want to enter into a dialogue with these possibilities and with 
Greene’s work. I also want to take on the implications by which an obstacle as an 
artifact could move beyond the instrumental motivations of its reified self. 
Claiming art’s specificity while retaining the specificity of the deeds of 
philosophy, one should be able to “fold back” the presumed hybrids by which 
art, philosophy, and education are often confused and neutralized.  
 In presenting how transgression is impossible without the specificity of art, 
education, and philosophy, I would like to articulate what Greene’s implication 
of an aesthetics education really implies. Greene’s aesthetic education is a choice 
of action that resorts to an understanding shared by Arendt, who tells us how 
“independent existence marks the work of art as a product of making; utter 
dependence upon further acts to keep it in existence marks the state as a product 
of action.” In contrast to this, Arendt (2000a) adds that, “the performing arts, on 
the contrary, have indeed a strong affinity with politics” (446).  
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 This begins to explain how, as we have seen with her case for murals, Greene 
focuses on the performative side of the arts and while tagging along with Arendt, 
she parts company in asserting her wider assumption of choices as a plural state 
of affairs. When Greene engages the arts in her work on aesthetics education at 
the Lincoln Centre (where her classes are recorded in her book Variations on a 
Blue Guitar), her approach to the performative constructions of realities that 
make things possible does not reduce them to simple ideas or projections. In 
Greene, we find distinct echoes of Arendt when she states that, “whatever occurs 
in this space of appearances is political by definition, even when it is not a direct 
product of action” (Arendt, 2000a, 447).  
 The tangibility by which Greene regards obstacles as artifacts almost mirrors 
the way by which Arendt regards the realm of performance and politics as states 
by which freedom becomes a worldly reality, where it is “tangible in words that 
can be heard, deeds that can be seen … events that are talked about …”. 
However for Greene, within these stories the tangible predominates in how we 
can handle—almost literally—both freedom and the obstacles that we make in 
our active life. 
 One could argue that as artifacts, obstacles gain an intimate tangibility that 
pertains to making, to poiein. As this takes us straight back into the performative 
narratives by which we partake of the freedoms and obstacles that characterize 
our stories and life, we also find that an intimate tangibility is most effectively an 
aesthetic event. We must remember that this aesthetic event is not simply 
hijacked by the romantic’s investment of aesthetics with beauty, but where 
aesthetics remains visibly and concretely positioned within the realms of feeling.  
 More so, as artifacts, obstacles are created. Obstacles become instruments by 
entering the realm of poiesis, as they also belong to our ability to create. Let us not 
forget that created objects imply actions whose tangibility is not simply received, 
but is partaken of by human action. Also we must bear in mind that here we are 
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speaking of artifacts and therefore of creations. As artifacts both the performative 
action of freedom and the artefactual nature of obstacles are created.  
 This takes us back to the myriad assumptions made in art and in education 
where we hear a lot about creativity, innovation and the imagination as if they were 
shibboleths that are supposed to give us free entry into the realms of the so-
called “creative and knowledge industries”. Yet we know that we always enter 
this realm at our risk. It is a risk that we need to take unless we are to allow 
instrumental reason to continue to do the representational work for us.  
  Created objects imply actions whose tangibility is not simply received, but 
partaken of by human action.  Mindful that when we engage with the 
institutionalized discourses of creativity and innovation, we are approaching the 
“gas chamber of life”, we must remember, once more, Greene’s description of 
“those who might be expected to go in search”, who “live among 
representations, images, symbolic renderings.” If this gas  “were felt and 
smelled,” the call to the managerial assumptions that turn aesthetic instruction 
into a standardized tool would cease. Yet as “the gas chamber of life” remains 
odorless it has succeeded to enter the discourse of education in a tangible way.  
 As the tangibility of the obstacle is concealed and as we are asked not to 
touch or smell what we are not able to measure, we continue to withdraw by 
entering even deeper into these gas chambers and with us we drag the 
assumptions that we make of the arts. In effect, what we are doing by a lot of 
what passes for aesthetics education, is the stripping down of the creative arts by 
conveniently rejecting their political inherence and their existential immanence. 
 
Resistance’s aesthetic tangibility 
 
So what are the threads of resistance that lead us to the “apparition of freedom” 
(Char, cited in Greene, 1988, 15) where, like the French poet and resistance 
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fighter René Char, we could escape from the opacity of the private sphere and 
gas chambers of life?  
 Greene argues that when she brings up Char’s example, she is not implying 
that the world is in the same imminent dangers as was Nazi occupation. Rather, 
it is because the apparition of freedom implies “an opening of a space” for those 
who opt to partake of this struggle for freedom. Those who choose not to retain 
the closure by which they seek to remain—not unlike Ishiguro’s butler Stevens in 
The Remains of the Day who, out of his loyalty to his employer, sought to suppress 
his own private indignation towards those who appeased and supported 
fascism. In this respect, Greene sees in Char’s approach a sense of freedom 
immersed in the community, a choice to live a vita activa. This kind of freedom is 
political inasmuch as it is a personal claim that converges and becomes real by 
dint of the community within which it is made.  
 Greene (1988) argues how being “ostensibly free French citizens” before the 
war, Char and his comrades “might have simply complained that their 
antecedent rights and liberties were being infringed” (16). She adds how they 
could have resorted to negative freedom, indeed “the right not to be interfered 
with or coerced or compelled to do what they did not choose to do” (16). This 
was a kind of an option, albeit impossible to sustain unless one decides to keep 
one’s head down and isolate him or herself in the opacity of an isolated private 
life. But Char and his comrades could not do what Ishiguro’s Stevens did, 
because they believed that “the ‘apparition of freedom’ was visiting them for the 
first time in their lives.” Greene (1988) clarifies that “not only does this suggest 
that they did not view freedom as a gift or endowment; they did not feel free in 
some interior dimension of their beings” (16). 
 In The Dialectic of Freedom (1988), Greene takes this scenario into education 
and how in so many ways freedom remains distanced from the “apparition” that 
happens in the public space, within the community, as a form of associated 
living, and how instead, this form of freedom is internalized into a private 
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matter. This is where themes that belong to the laissez-faire notion of freedom and 
capital have returned. They reappear in the approach to how one conducts him 
or herself in a community. They are endorsed by the discourse of schooling and 
by a system of education based on competition. I would add that this also 
sustains a distorted version of meritocracy, which awards those who appear to 
have made it by denigrating and forgetting those who have not “succeeded” 
because their disadvantage gave them no chance. “Deregulation, 
noninterference, privatization: All are linked to the development of ‘character’, to 
consumption, to merit, to (deserved) material gain” (Greene, 1988, 17). In this 
construction of liberty, one is assumed to be left to his or her devises, as if that 
would guarantee someone’s success and more so one’s engagement with the 
community. 
 If anything, this approach to liberty has left us all isolated, all cooped in the 
closed assumptions of individualism with no support system that works. “Public 
servants seldom acknowledge any longer what was once considered a ‘right’ to 
income support when needed, or to housing, or to medical attention. And, quite 
obviously, the wealthy, the advantaged, benefit from this new attention to 
freedom” (Greene, 1988, 17). 
 I happen to consider Maxine Greene’s Dialectic of Freedom as one of those 
canons of educational thinking. I would put it up there with Freire’s Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed (1972), Illich’s Deschooling Society (1999) and now with Rancière’s 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991). I wouldn't be the only academic who would set 
these four books as core texts for education students. And this is done for a 
reason: If we are to speak of resistance, of being willing to contribute to the 
“apparition of freedom”, these four texts bring together a number of 
foundational questions that comprehensively ask what education and freedom 
are all about. More so, they assert in their divergent ways that liberty and 
education are not casual partners, but that they immanently inform each other to 
such a depth that one cannot speak of one without the other, and where 
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situations in which education turns out to be unfree this would negate 
education’s own claims to exist as such.  
 At the end of the day, unless students and teachers are convinced that we are 
the makers of resistance, and that the apparition of freedom cannot happen 
unless two or three of us engage with each other in the very name of freedom, 
then we would never understand how resistance comes to assert its tangible and 
haptic situatedness through us. If the self were to simply inhabit in its own space 
without any relatedness to other spaces, its sense of being would lack both 
freedom and intelligence. Freedom will never appear in such a state of affairs. 
This is because freedom is impossible without our exertion of our choices from 
within a relatedness by which we can make such an assertion. It is equally true 
that unless these choices are made within the public spaces of the community, 
they remain opaque. They may be comfortable to individualists, but their sense 
of freedom would be as effective as one surviving totalitarianism by forfeiting 
one’s own sense of being. This will be like a world without an opportunity to 
engage with the ugliness and beauty that make it; or like a piece of music that 
could never be played or heard.  
 Greene’s unique approach to education is primarily exciting because before 
she ever engages with teaching, or learning, or a school or classroom, she 
engages with human beings who live in a society and who partake of its senses—
the good, the bad, the beautiful and the ugly. Before she engages in the 
mechanisms of education, she begins with how teachers and students feel; how, 
as existing beings they confront their life and make sense of it. Schools that won’t 
give us the opportunity to engage with our sense of self would be nothing more 
than a factory where learning is computational and programmatic.  
 Education without a sense of aesthetics is like a painting that we all know 
about but we could never see or experience. It is here that Maxine urges us to 
start painting murals once more, and to extend our dialogue and situatedness 
“far beyond the agencies and offices and even classrooms”. What education 
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should stand for is not that different from freedom. In Greene’s sense of the 
word, this freedom is a means by which we reach beyond the “sad opaqueness of 
private life,” and I would add, by which we find a way of exiting the chambers in 
which we have stood still and accepted the benign opiate that makes us consent 
to all those forms of direct and indirect oppression. As we leave the closure of a 
schooled society and move out into the freedom of an educated life, the public 
externality of a mural grasps at one go what it is to be free through one’s own 
performative agency by doing and being at the epicenter of the public realm.   
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